| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7323 |
| DP7323 Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work | |
| Chaim Fershtman; Ariel Pakes | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-06-14 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The election mechanism has difficulties in selecting the most able candidates and deselecting less able ones. In a simple model we show that the power of elections as a selection and incentive device can be improved by requiring higher vote thresholds than 50% for incumbents. A higher vote threshold makes it impossible for office-holders of low ability to pool with more able office-holders in order to be reelected. As a consequence, the average ability of reelected politicians and the average effort level tends to increase. The socially optimal threshold can be set by the public. Alternatively, one could allow candidates to compete with individual vote thresholds. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Effort Elections Incumbents Political contracts Selection Vote-share thresholds |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7323 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536154 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Chaim Fershtman,Ariel Pakes. DP7323 Finite State Dynamic Games with Asymmetric Information: A Framework for Applied Work. 2009. |
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