| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7313 |
| DP7313 The Doha Round and Market Access for LDCs: Scenarios for the EU and US Markets | |
| Jaime de Melo; Céline Carrère | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | With applied work in mind, we define an equilibrium notion for dynamic games with asymmetric information which does not require a specification for players' beliefs about their opponent types. This enables us to define equilibrium conditions which, at least in principal, are testable and can be computed using a simple reinforcement learning algorithm. We conclude with an example that endogenizes the maintenance decisions for electricity generators in a dynamic game among electric utilities in which the costs states of the generators are private information. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Applied markov equilibrium Dynamic games Dynamic oligopoly |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7313 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536164 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jaime de Melo,Céline Carrère. DP7313 The Doha Round and Market Access for LDCs: Scenarios for the EU and US Markets. 2009. |
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