| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7331 |
| DP7331 The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures | |
| Patrick W. Schmitz; Eva Hoppe-Fischer | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the effect of additional private information in an agency model with an endogenous information structure. If more private information becomes available to the agent, this may hurt the agent, benefit the principal, and affect the total surplus ambiguously. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Hidden information Information gathering |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7331 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536168 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Patrick W. Schmitz,Eva Hoppe-Fischer. DP7331 The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Structures. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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