| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7332 |
| DP7332 Investments and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market | |
| Helmut Bester | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-06-23 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | During the 1930s, rating agencies took up a central role in regulatory supervision that they still have today. We study the process through which they received this regulatory license. The proximate cause for this changeover was the economic shock of the Great Depression. Exploring the performance of rating agencies in assessing the risks of sovereign debt, an important segment of the bond market, we show that superior forecasting capacities cannot explain the agencies? growing importance. We argue that the agencies? perceived lack of conflicts of interest (in contrast to other financial intermediaries) was a major factor in bringing them to the forefront of a new regulatory regime. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Great depression Rating agencies regulatory licence Sovereign debt |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7332 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536169 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helmut Bester. DP7332 Investments and the Holdup Problem in a Matching Market. 2009. |
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