| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7347 |
| DP7347 The End of Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality of Sovereign Bond Markets, 1815-2007 | |
| Marc Flandreau; Juan Flores; Norbert Gaillard; Sebastian Nieto-Parra | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-06-28 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies investment incentives in the steady state of a dynamic bilateral matching market. Because of search frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked-in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments. The associated holdup problem depends on market conditions and is more important for the long side of the market. In the case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is always underinvestment on both sides of the market. But when market frictions become negligible, the equilibrium investment levels tend towards the first-best. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Holdup problem Investments Matching market |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7347 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536184 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marc Flandreau,Juan Flores,Norbert Gaillard,et al. DP7347 The End of Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality of Sovereign Bond Markets, 1815-2007. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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