G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7347
DP7347 The End of Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality of Sovereign Bond Markets, 1815-2007
Marc Flandreau; Juan Flores; Norbert Gaillard; Sebastian Nieto-Parra
发表日期2009-06-28
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要This paper studies investment incentives in the steady state of a dynamic bilateral matching market. Because of search frictions, both parties in a match are partially locked-in when they bargain over the joint surplus from their sunk investments. The associated holdup problem depends on market conditions and is more important for the long side of the market. In the case of investments in homogenous capital only the agents on the short side acquire ownership of capital. There is always underinvestment on both sides of the market. But when market frictions become negligible, the equilibrium investment levels tend towards the first-best.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Holdup problem Investments Matching market
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7347
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536184
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marc Flandreau,Juan Flores,Norbert Gaillard,et al. DP7347 The End of Gatekeeping: Underwriters and the Quality of Sovereign Bond Markets, 1815-2007. 2009.
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