| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP7348
|
| DP7348 The Exchange Rate Effect of Multi-Currency Risk Arbitrage |
| Harald Hau
|
| 发表日期 | 2009-06-28
|
| 出版年 | 2009
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | The objective of this paper is to provide a political economy explanation of the empirically observed negative correlation between employment protection and insurance. We study an economy composed of four groups of agents (capitalists, unemployed people, low- and high-skilled workers), each one represented by a politician. Politicians first form political parties and then compete in a winner-takes-all election by simultaneously proposing policy bundles composed of an employment protection level and an unemployment benefit. We first show that, in the absence of parties (i.e., in a citizen-candidate model), low-skilled workers are decisive and support a maximum employment protection level together with some unemployment benefit. We then obtain that, under some conditions, allowing for party formation results in all policy equilibria being in the Pareto set of the coalition formed by high-skilled workers together with unemployed people. Policies in this Pareto set exhibit a negative correlation between employment protection and unemployment benefit. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics
|
| 关键词 | Bidimensional voting
Citizen-candidate
Flexicurity
Labor market rigidities
Party competition
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7348
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
|
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536185
|
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Harald Hau. DP7348 The Exchange Rate Effect of Multi-Currency Risk Arbitrage. 2009.
|
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