G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7349
DP7349 Bad Bank(s) and Recapitalization of the Banking Sector
Klaus F. Zimmermann; Dorothea Schäfer
发表日期2009-06-28
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要The consequences of business cycle contingencies in unemployment insurance systems are considered in a search-matching model allowing for shifts between "good" and "bad" states of nature. We show that not only is there an insurance argument for such contingencies, but also an incentive argument. If benefits are less distortionary in a recession than a boom, it follows that countercyclical benefits reduce average distortions compared to state independent benefits. We show that optimal benefits are state contingent and tend to reduce the structural (average) unemployment rate, although the variability of unemployment may increase.
主题Labour Economics
关键词Unemployment benefits Business cycle Insurance Incentives
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7349
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536186
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Klaus F. Zimmermann,Dorothea Schäfer. DP7349 Bad Bank(s) and Recapitalization of the Banking Sector. 2009.
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