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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP7349 |
DP7349 Bad Bank(s) and Recapitalization of the Banking Sector | |
Klaus F. Zimmermann; Dorothea Schäfer | |
发表日期 | 2009-06-28 |
出版年 | 2009 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | The consequences of business cycle contingencies in unemployment insurance systems are considered in a search-matching model allowing for shifts between "good" and "bad" states of nature. We show that not only is there an insurance argument for such contingencies, but also an incentive argument. If benefits are less distortionary in a recession than a boom, it follows that countercyclical benefits reduce average distortions compared to state independent benefits. We show that optimal benefits are state contingent and tend to reduce the structural (average) unemployment rate, although the variability of unemployment may increase. |
主题 | Labour Economics |
关键词 | Unemployment benefits Business cycle Insurance Incentives |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7349 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536186 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Klaus F. Zimmermann,Dorothea Schäfer. DP7349 Bad Bank(s) and Recapitalization of the Banking Sector. 2009. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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