| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7351 |
| DP7351 Rational and Naive Herding | |
| Matthew Rabin; Erik Eyster | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-07-05 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In social-learning environments, we investigate implications of the assumption that people naively believe that each previous person's action reflects solely that person's private information, leading them to systematically imitate all predecessors even in the many circumstances where rational agents do not. Naive herders inadvertently over-weight early movers' private signals by neglecting that interim herders' actions also embed these signals. They herd with positive probability on incorrect actions across a broad array of rich-information settings where rational players never do, and---because they become fully confident even when wrong---can be harmed on average by observing others. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Cursed equiliibrium Herding Naive inference Social learning |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7351 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536188 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Matthew Rabin,Erik Eyster. DP7351 Rational and Naive Herding. 2009. |
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