全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP7373 Do Financial Incentives for Firms Promote Employment of Disabled Workers? A Regression Discontinuity Approach

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP7373
	DP7373 Do Financial Incentives for Firms Promote Employment of Disabled Workers? A Regression Discontinuity Approach
	Josef Zweimüller; Rafael Lalive; Jean-Philippe Wuellrich
发表日期	2009-07-19
出版年	2009
语种	英语
摘要	We use survey data to study American households? propensity to default when the value of their mortgage exceeds the value of their house even if they can afford to pay their mortgage (strategic default). We find that 26% of the existing defaults are strategic. We also find that no household would default if the equity shortfall is less than 10% of the value of the house. Yet, 17% of households would default, even if they can afford to pay their mortgage, when the equity shortfall reaches 50% of the value of their house. Besides relocation costs, the most important variables in predicting strategic default are moral and social considerations. Ceteris paribus, people who consider it immoral to default are at 77% less likely to declare their intention to do so, while people who know someone who defaulted are 82% more likely to declare their intention to do so. The willingness to default increases nonlinearly with the proportion of foreclosures in the same ZIP code. That moral attitudes toward default do not change with the percentage of foreclosures is likely to derive from a contagion effect that reduces the social stigma associated with default as defaults become more common.
主题	Financial Economics
关键词	Foreclosure Moral constraint Mortgage Social constraint Strategic default
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp7373
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536210
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Josef Zweimüller,Rafael Lalive,Jean-Philippe Wuellrich. DP7373 Do Financial Incentives for Firms Promote Employment of Disabled Workers? A Regression Discontinuity Approach. 2009.