| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7408 |
| DP7408 Referral and Job Performance: Evidence from the Ghana Colonial Army | |
| Marcel Fafchamps; Alexander Moradi | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-08-16 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | I describe a new static (sealed-bid) auction for differentiated goods - the "Product-Mix Auction". Bidders bid on multiple assets simultaneously, and bidtakers choose supply functions across assets. The auction yields greater efficiency, revenue, information, and trade than running multiple separate auctions. It is also often simpler to use and understand, and less vulnerable to collusion, than a simultaneous multiple round auction. I designed it after the 2007 Northern Rock bank-run to help the Bank of England fight the credit crunch; in 2008 the U.S. Treasury planned using a related design to buy "toxic assets"; it may be used to purchase electricity. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Central banking Multi-object auction Simultaneous ascending auction Tarp Term auction Treasury auction |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7408 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536246 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marcel Fafchamps,Alexander Moradi. DP7408 Referral and Job Performance: Evidence from the Ghana Colonial Army. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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