G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7411
DP7411 Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?
Jeremy Bulow; Paul Klemperer
发表日期2009-08-16
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要We examine global economic dynamics under infinite-horizon learning in a New Keynesian model in which the interest-rate rule is subject to the zero lower bound. As in Evans, Guse and Honkapohja (2008), we find that under normal monetary and fiscal policy the intended steady state is locally but not globally stable. Unstable deflationary paths can arise after large pessimistic shocks to expectations. For large expectation shocks pushing interest rates to the zero lower bound, temporary increases in government spending can be used to insulate the economy from deflation traps.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Adaptive learning Fiscal policy monetary policy Zero interest rate lower bound
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7411
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536248
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Jeremy Bulow,Paul Klemperer. DP7411 Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?. 2009.
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