G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7427
DP7427 Government Purchases and the Real Exchange Rate
Robert Kollmann
发表日期2009-08-23
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要As formalized by Montgomery (1991), referral by employees improves efficiency if the unobserved quality of a new worker is higher than that of unrefereed workers. Using data compiled from army archives, we test whether the referral system in use in the British colonial army in Ghana served to improve the unobserved quality of new recruits. We find that it did not: referred recruits were more likely than unreferred recruits to desert or be dismissed as 'inefficient' or 'unfit'. We find instead evidence of referee opportunism. The fact that referred recruits have better observed characteristics at the time of recruitment suggests that army recruiters may have been aware of this problem.
主题Development Economics
关键词Employee referral Worker productivity Hidden attributes
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7427
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536263
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Robert Kollmann. DP7427 Government Purchases and the Real Exchange Rate. 2009.
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