| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7427 |
| DP7427 Government Purchases and the Real Exchange Rate | |
| Robert Kollmann | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | As formalized by Montgomery (1991), referral by employees improves efficiency if the unobserved quality of a new worker is higher than that of unrefereed workers. Using data compiled from army archives, we test whether the referral system in use in the British colonial army in Ghana served to improve the unobserved quality of new recruits. We find that it did not: referred recruits were more likely than unreferred recruits to desert or be dismissed as 'inefficient' or 'unfit'. We find instead evidence of referee opportunism. The fact that referred recruits have better observed characteristics at the time of recruitment suggests that army recruiters may have been aware of this problem. |
| 主题 | Development Economics |
| 关键词 | Employee referral Worker productivity Hidden attributes |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7427 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536263 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Robert Kollmann. DP7427 Government Purchases and the Real Exchange Rate. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
| 个性服务 |
| 推荐该条目 |
| 保存到收藏夹 |
| 导出为Endnote文件 |
| 谷歌学术 |
| 谷歌学术中相似的文章 |
| [Robert Kollmann]的文章 |
| 百度学术 |
| 百度学术中相似的文章 |
| [Robert Kollmann]的文章 |
| 必应学术 |
| 必应学术中相似的文章 |
| [Robert Kollmann]的文章 |
| 相关权益政策 |
| 暂无数据 |
| 收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
