| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7433 |
| DP7433 Profit Taxation and Finance Constraints | |
| Christian Keuschnigg; Evelyn Ribi | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Contractual execution generates hard information, available to the contracting parties, even when contracts are secretly executed. Building on this simple observation, the paper shows that incomplete contracts can be preferred to complete contracts. This is because (i) execution of incomplete contracts reveals less information to outside parties, giving rise to strategic gains; (ii) secretly executed complete contracts could not do better, given the possible strategic uses of the hard information generated by execution of the contract. The key effects at work are explored in the case of financial contracts for innovative start-up companies, providing a rationale for the observed differences in the extent to which venture capital contracts include a variety of contingencies, and for how this varies across industries and geographically. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Competition Contingencies Execution Hard evidence Incomplete contracts Venture capital |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7433 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536267 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Christian Keuschnigg,Evelyn Ribi. DP7433 Profit Taxation and Finance Constraints. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
