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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP7434 |
DP7434 Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening | |
Giancarlo Spagnolo; Giacomo Calzolari | |
发表日期 | 2009-08-23 |
出版年 | 2009 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper proposes a model of boundedly rational choice that explains the well known attraction and compromise effects. Choices in our model are interpreted as a cooperative solution to a bargaining problem among an individual?s conflicting dual selves. We axiomatically characterize a unique bargaining solution that captures both effects when the selves? preferences are known. We then provide a revealed preference foundation to our solution, and characterize the extent to which these two underlying preference relations can be uniquely identified. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Attraction effect Bounded rationality Compromise effect Cooperative bargaining Fallback bargaining Reason-based-choice |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7434 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536268 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Giancarlo Spagnolo,Giacomo Calzolari. DP7434 Relational Contracts and Competitive Screening. 2009. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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