| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7437 |
| DP7437 Gender and Competition | |
| Alison Booth | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-08-23 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments. Leniency further increases deterrence, but stabilizes surviving cartels: subjects appear to anticipate harsher times after defections as leniency reduces recidivism and lowers post-conviction prices. With rewards, cartels are reported systematically and prices finally fall. If a ringleader is excluded from leniency, deterrence is unaffected but prices grow. Differences between treatments in Stockholm and Rome suggest culture may affect optimal law enforcement. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Cartels Collusion Competition policy Coordination Corporate crime Desistance Deterrence Law enforcement Organized crime Price-fixing |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7437 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536271 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alison Booth. DP7437 Gender and Competition. 2009. |
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