G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7440
DP7440 Impact of Paternal Temporary Absence on Children Left Behind
Alison Booth; Yuji Tamura
发表日期2009-09-06
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要In the absence of financing frictions, profit taxes reduce investment by their effect on the user cost of capital. With finance constraints due to moral hazard, investment becomes sensitive to cash-flow and own equity of firms. We propose a corporate finance model of investment and derive three central results: (i) Even small taxes impose first order welfare losses on financially constrained firms; (ii) ACE and cash-flow tax systems, which are investment neutral in the neoclassical model, are no longer neutral when firms are finance constrained. (iii) When banks are active and provide external finance together with monitoring services, the two systems not only reduce investment, but are also no longer equivalent. With active banks, investment is subject to double moral hazard and the timing of tax payments becomes important. The ACE system gives tax relief at the return stage and provides better incentives than a cash-flow tax which gives tax relief upfront.
主题Public Economics
关键词Ace tax Cash-flow tax Finance constraints Profit tax
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7440
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536276
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alison Booth,Yuji Tamura. DP7440 Impact of Paternal Temporary Absence on Children Left Behind. 2009.
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