| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7441 |
| DP7441 On the Real Effects of Bank Bailouts: Micro-Evidence from Japan | |
| Mariassunta Giannetti; Andrei Simonov | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-09-06 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study the tension between competitive screening and contract enforcement where a principal trades repeatedly with one among several agents, moral hazard and adverse selection coexist, and non-contractible dimensions are governed by relational contracting. We simultaneously characterize optimal relational contracts and competitive screening policies which are interdependent. When non-contractible dimensions are important, the principal optimally restricts competitive screening to a subset of 'loyal' agents, giving up performance bonuses and, when such dimensions are crucial, negotiates an indefinitely renewable contract with one agent. To enhance enforcement, explicit contract duration is also reduced. However, these policies facilitate collusion among agents, which induces an additional trade-off between reputational forces and collusion. When non-contractible dimensions are very important this last trade-off may disappear, as collusion allows more efficient enforcement of better performance. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Auctions Collusion Contract duration Efficiency wages Implicit and incomplete contracts Limited enforcement Loyalty Multi-tasking Negotiation Non-contractible quality |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7441 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536277 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Mariassunta Giannetti,Andrei Simonov. DP7441 On the Real Effects of Bank Bailouts: Micro-Evidence from Japan. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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