G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7442
DP7442 Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation
Ailsa Roell; Lin Peng
发表日期2009-09-06
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要Commonly used frictional models of the labor market imply that changes in frictions have large effects on steady state employment and unemployment. We use a model that features both frictions and an operative labor supply margin to examine the robustness of this feature to the inclusion of a empirically reasonable labor supply channel. The response of unemployment to changes in frictions is similar in both models. But the labor supply response present in our model greatly attenuates the effects of frictions on steady state employment relative to the simplest matching model, and two common extensions. We also find that the presence of empirically plausible frictions has virtually no impact on the response of aggregate employment to taxes.
主题International Macroeconomics ; Labour Economics
关键词Labour market frictions Labour supply Taxes
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7442
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536278
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Ailsa Roell,Lin Peng. DP7442 Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation. 2009.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Ailsa Roell]的文章
[Lin Peng]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Ailsa Roell]的文章
[Lin Peng]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Ailsa Roell]的文章
[Lin Peng]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。