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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP7486 |
DP7486 Firm Dynamics Support the Importance of the Embodied Question | |
Omar Licandro; Alain Gabler | |
发表日期 | 2009-10-04 |
出版年 | 2009 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We consider a model where two adversaries can spend resources in acquiring public information about the unknown state of the world in order to influence the choice of a decision maker. We characterize the sampling strategies of the adversaries in the equilibrium of the game. We show that, as the cost of information acquisition for one adversary increases, that person collects less evidence whereas the other adversary collects more evidence. We then test the results in a controlled laboratory setting. The behavior of subjects is close to the theoretical predictions. Mistakes are relatively infrequent (15%). They occur in both directions, with more over-sampling (39%) than under-sampling (8%). The main difference with the theory is the smooth decline in sampling around the theoretical equilibrium. Comparative statics are also consistent with the theory, with adversaries sampling more when their own cost is low and when the other adversary's cost is high. Finally, there is little evidence of learning over the 40 matches of the experiment. |
主题 | Industrial Organization ; Public Economics |
关键词 | Adversarial system Experiment Information acquisition Search |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7486 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536323 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Omar Licandro,Alain Gabler. DP7486 Firm Dynamics Support the Importance of the Embodied Question. 2009. |
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