| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7506 |
| DP7506 Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. Hayek | |
| Xavier Vives; Giovanni Cespa | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-10-18 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper shows that absent a commitment technology, central banks can nevertheless achieve the (timeless-)optimal commitment equilibrium if they are delegated with an objective function that is different from the societal one. In a prototypical forward-looking New Keynesian model, I develop a general linear-quadratic method to solve for the optimal delegation parameters that generate the optimal amount of inertia in a Markov-perfect equilibrium. I study the optimal design of some policy regimes that are nested within this framework: inflation, output-gap growth and nominal income growth targeting; and inflation and output-gap contracts. Notably, since the timeless-optimal equilibrium is time-consistent, so is any delegation scheme that implements it. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Discretion and commitment Inertia Stabilization bias Optimal delegation Time inconsistency inflation output gap growth and nominal income growth targeting. Timeless-optimal policy |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7506 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536342 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Xavier Vives,Giovanni Cespa. DP7506 Dynamic Trading and Asset Prices: Keynes vs. Hayek. 2009. |
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