| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7512 |
| DP7512 Heterogeneous Class Size Effects: New Evidence from a Panel of University Students | |
| Oriana Bandiera; Imran Rasul; Valentino Larcinese | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-10-25 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | How damaging is competition between bank regulators? This paper models regulators that compete because they want to supervise more banks. Both banks' risk profiles and their access to wholesale funding are endogenous, leading to rich interactions. The sensitivity of regulatory standards to bank moral hazard, adverse selection, liquidity risk and the degree of regulatory bias is investigated. A calibration suggests that regulatory reform can halve bank default rates. The paper also shows how a decline in regulators' monitoring capacity gives rise to a gradual rise in bank risk, followed by a sudden interbank crisis. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | supervision Arbitrage Bank default Moral hazard Interbank market |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7512 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536348 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Oriana Bandiera,Imran Rasul,Valentino Larcinese. DP7512 Heterogeneous Class Size Effects: New Evidence from a Panel of University Students. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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