| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7551 |
| DP7551 Liquidity cycles and make/take fees in electronic markets | |
| Thierry Foucault; Eugene Kandel; Ohad Kadan | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-11-15 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple collusion game. Consistent with the existing literature on communication and collusion, even minimal communication leads to a short run increase in collusion. However, in a limited message-space treatment where subjects cannot communicate contingent strategies, this initial burst of collusion rapidly collapses. When unlimited pre-game communication is allowed via a chat window, an initial decline in collusion is reversed over time. Content analysis is used to identify multiple channels by which communication improves collusion in this setting. Explicit threats to punish cheating prove to be by far the most important factor to successfully establish collusion, consistent with the existing theory of collusion. However, collusion is even more likely when we allow for renegotiation, contrary to standard theories of renegotiation. What appears critical for the success of collusion with renegotiation is that cheaters are often admonished in strong terms. Allowing renegotiation therefore appears to increase collusion by allowing for an inexpensive and highly effective form of punishment. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Collusion Communication Experiments Guilt aversion Renegotiation Trust |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7551 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536387 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thierry Foucault,Eugene Kandel,Ohad Kadan. DP7551 Liquidity cycles and make/take fees in electronic markets. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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