G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7571
DP7571 Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter?
Francesca Cornelli; Alexander Ljungqvist; Zbigniew Kominek
发表日期2009-11-22
出版年2009
语种英语
摘要We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed ?hard? information about the board?s performance expectations and ?soft? information about board and CEO actions and the board?s beliefs about CEO competence in 473 mostly private-sector companies backed by private equity funds between 1993 and 2008. We find that CEOs are fired when the company underperforms relative to the board?s expectations, suggesting that boards use performance to update their beliefs. CEOs are especially likely to be fired when evidence has mounted that they are incompetent and when board power has increased following corporate governance reforms. In contrast, CEOs are not fired when performance deteriorates due to factors deemed explicitly to be beyond their control, nor are they fired for making 'honest mistakes.' Following forced CEO turnover, companies see performance improvements and their investors are considerably more likely to eventually sell them at a profit.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Boards of directors Ceo turnover Corporate governance Large shareholders Legal reforms Private equity Transition economies
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7571
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536408
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Francesca Cornelli,Alexander Ljungqvist,Zbigniew Kominek. DP7571 Monitoring Managers: Does it Matter?. 2009.
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