| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7585 |
| DP7585 The role of central bank transparency for guiding private sector forecasts | |
| Sylvester Eijffinger; Michael Ehrmann; Marcel Fratzscher | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-12-06 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives state-by-state, rather than merely on average. This tightly constrains the set of admissible contracts and allows for a simple solution to the contracting problem. Our results continue to hold in continuous time, where noise and actions are simultaneous. We thus extend the tractable contracts of Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) to settings that do not require exponential utility, a pecuniary cost of effort, Gaussian noise or continuous time. The contract's functional form is independent of the noise distribution. Moreover, if the cost of effort is pecuniary (multiplicative), the contract is linear (log-linear) in output and its slope is independent of the noise distribution, utility function and reservation utility. In a two-stage contracting game, the optimal target action depends on the costs and benefits of the environment, but is independent of the noise realization. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics |
| 关键词 | Closed forms Contract theory Dispersive order Executive compensation Incentives Principal-agent problem Subderivative |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7585 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536422 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sylvester Eijffinger,Michael Ehrmann,Marcel Fratzscher. DP7585 The role of central bank transparency for guiding private sector forecasts. 2009. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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