| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7597 |
| DP7597 Do expectations matter? The Great Moderation revisited | |
| Fabio Canova; Luca Gambetti | |
| 发表日期 | 2009-12-13 |
| 出版年 | 2009 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Consider a seller and a buyer who write a contract. After that, the seller produces a good. She can influence the expected quality of the good by making unobservable investments. Only the seller learns the realized quality. Finally, trade can occur. It is always ex post efficient to trade. Yet, it may be impossible to achieve the first best, even though the risk-neutral parties are symmetrically informed at the contracting stage and complete contracts can be written. The second best is characterized by distortions that are reminiscent of adverse selection models (i.e., models with precontractual private information but without hidden actions). |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Common values Hidden action Hidden information Hold-up problem |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7597 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536434 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Fabio Canova,Luca Gambetti. DP7597 Do expectations matter? The Great Moderation revisited. 2009. |
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