| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7632 |
| DP7632 Incentive Effects of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts: Evidence from Chile | |
| Jan C. van Ours; Milan Vodopivec; Gonzalo Reyes | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-01-17 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This study examines the determinants of job-finding rates of unemployment benefit recipients under the Chilean program. This is a unique, innovative program that combines social insurance through a solidarity fund (SF) with self-insurance in the form of unemployment insurance savings accounts (UISAs) - so as to mitigate the moral hazard problem of traditional unemployment insurance programs. Our study is the first one to empirically investigate whether UISAs improve work incentives. We find that for beneficiaries using the SF, the pattern of job finding rates over the duration of unemployment is consistent with moral hazard effects, while for beneficiaries relying on UISAs, the pattern is free of such effects. We also find that for benefit recipient not entitled to use the SF, the amount of accumulation on the UISA does not affect the exit rate from unemployment, suggesting that such individuals internalize the costs of unemployment benefits. Our results provide strong support to the idea that UISAs can improve work incentives. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Savings account Unemployment duration Unemployment insurance |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7632 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536469 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Jan C. van Ours,Milan Vodopivec,Gonzalo Reyes. DP7632 Incentive Effects of Unemployment Insurance Savings Accounts: Evidence from Chile. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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