G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7636
DP7636 Vertical Relations under Credit Constraints
Volker Nocke; John Thanassoulis
发表日期2010-01-17
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要We model the impact credit constraints and market risk have on the vertical relationships between firms in the supply chain. Firms which might face credit constraints in future investments become endogenously risk averse when accumulating pledgable income. In the short run, the optimal supply contract therefore involves risk sharing, thereby inducing double marginalization. Credit constraints thus result in higher retail prices. The model offers a concise explanation for several empirical regularities of firm behavior. We demonstrate an intrinsic complementarity between supply and lending providing a theory of finance arms of major suppliers; a monetary transmission mechanism linking the cost of borrowing with short-run retail prices that can help explain the price puzzle in macroeconomics; a theory of countervailing power based on credit constraints; and a motive for outsourcing supply (or distribution) in the face of market risk.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Countervailing power Double marginalization Finance arms Financial companies Market risk Monetary transmission mechanism Outsourcing Price puzzle Risk aversion Risk sharing
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7636
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536473
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Volker Nocke,John Thanassoulis. DP7636 Vertical Relations under Credit Constraints. 2010.
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