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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP7636 |
DP7636 Vertical Relations under Credit Constraints | |
Volker Nocke; John Thanassoulis | |
发表日期 | 2010-01-17 |
出版年 | 2010 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | We model the impact credit constraints and market risk have on the vertical relationships between firms in the supply chain. Firms which might face credit constraints in future investments become endogenously risk averse when accumulating pledgable income. In the short run, the optimal supply contract therefore involves risk sharing, thereby inducing double marginalization. Credit constraints thus result in higher retail prices. The model offers a concise explanation for several empirical regularities of firm behavior. We demonstrate an intrinsic complementarity between supply and lending providing a theory of finance arms of major suppliers; a monetary transmission mechanism linking the cost of borrowing with short-run retail prices that can help explain the price puzzle in macroeconomics; a theory of countervailing power based on credit constraints; and a motive for outsourcing supply (or distribution) in the face of market risk. |
主题 | Industrial Organization |
关键词 | Countervailing power Double marginalization Finance arms Financial companies Market risk Monetary transmission mechanism Outsourcing Price puzzle Risk aversion Risk sharing |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7636 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536473 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Volker Nocke,John Thanassoulis. DP7636 Vertical Relations under Credit Constraints. 2010. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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