| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7641 |
| DP7641 The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard | |
| Estelle Cantillon; Eric Budish | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-01-17 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper uses data consisting of students' strategically reported preferences and their underlying true preferences to study the course allocation mechanism used at Harvard Business School. We show that the mechanism is manipulable in theory, manipulated in practice, and that these manipulations cause meaningful welfare losses. However, we also find that ex-ante welfare is higher than under the strategyproof and ex-post efficient alternative, the Random Serial Dictatorship. We trace the poor ex-ante performance of RSD to a phenomenon specific to multi-unit assignment, "callousness". We draw lessons for the design of multi-unit assignment mechanisms and for market design more broadly. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Course allocation Dictatorship Market design Multi-unit assignment Random serial dictatorship Ex-ante efficiency Ex-post efficiency Strategyproofness Strategic behaviour Field data |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7641 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536478 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Estelle Cantillon,Eric Budish. DP7641 The Multi-unit Assignment Problem: Theory and Evidence from Course Allocation at Harvard. 2010. |
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