| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7658 |
| DP7658 Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs | |
| Klaus Schmidt; Ernst Fehr; Björn Bartling | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-01-24 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In recent decades, many firms offered more discretion to their employees, often increasing the productivity of effort but also leaving more opportunities for shirking. These "high-performance work systems" are difficult to understand in terms of standard moral hazard models. We show experimentally that complementarities between high effort discretion, rent-sharing, screening opportunities, and competition are important driving forces behind these new forms of work organization. We document in particular the endogenous emergence of two fundamentally distinct types of employment strategies. Employers either implement a control strategy, which consists of low effort discretion and little or no rent-sharing, or they implement a trust strategy, which stipulates high effort discretion and substantial rent-sharing. If employers cannot screen employees, the control strategy prevails, while the possibility of screening renders the trust strategy profitable. The introduction of competition substantially fosters the trust strategy, reduces market segmentation, and leads to large welfare gains for both employers and employees. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Job design High-performance work systems Screening Reputation Competition Trust Control Social preferences Complementarities |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7658 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536495 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Klaus Schmidt,Ernst Fehr,Björn Bartling. DP7658 Screening, Competition, and Job Design: Economic Origins of Good Jobs. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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