| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7659 |
| DP7659 Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians | |
| Winand Emons | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-01-24 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We consider physicians with fixed capacity levels. If a physician's capacity exceeds demand, she may have an incentive to overtreat, i.e., she may provide unnecessary treatments to use up idle capacity. By contrast, with excess demand she may undertreat, i.e., she may not provide necessary treatments since other activities are financially more attractive. We first show that simple fee-for-service reimbursement schemes do not provide proper incentives. If insurers use, however, fee-for-service schemes with quantity restrictions, they solve the fraudulent physician problem. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Credence goods Demand inducement Expert services Incentives Insurance Medical doctors |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7659 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536496 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Winand Emons. DP7659 Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians. 2010. |
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