| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7663 |
| DP7663 Thanks for Nothing? Not-for-Profits and Motivated Agents | |
| Maitreesh Ghatak; Hannes Mueller | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-01-24 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them, or that they dominate for-profits in terms of welfare, but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non-profit form more attractive to managers. We show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not-for-profit firms would be competed out by for-profit firms. Therefore, the choice between not-for-profit and for-profit provision is not always a question of resolving incentive problems but also one of distribution of rents between management and workers, and consequently, the relative scarcity of workers plays an important role in this choice. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Not-for-profits Intrinsic motivation Labor donation Free riding |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7663 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536500 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Maitreesh Ghatak,Hannes Mueller. DP7663 Thanks for Nothing? Not-for-Profits and Motivated Agents. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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