| 来源类型 | Discussion paper
|
| 规范类型 | 论文
|
| 来源ID | DP7665
|
| DP7665 Fiscal Centralization and the Political Process |
| Facundo Albornoz-Crespo
|
| 发表日期 | 2010-01-31
|
| 出版年 | 2010
|
| 语种 | 英语
|
| 摘要 | We study the dynamic support for fiscal decentralization in a political agency model from the perspective of a region. We show that corruption opportunities are lower under centralization at each period of time. However, centralization makes more difficult for citizens to detect corrupt incumbents. Thus, corruption is easier under centralization for low levels of political competition. We show that the relative advantage of centralization depends negatively on the quality of the local political class, but it is greater if the center and the region are subject to similar government productivity shocks. When we endogenize the quality of local politicians, we establish a positive link between the development of the private sector and the support for decentralization. Since political support to centralization evolves over time, driven either by economic/political development or by exogenous changes in preferences over public good consumption, it is possible that voters are (rationally) discontent about it. Also, preferences of voters and the politicians about centralization can diverge when political competition is weak. |
| 主题 | Public Economics
|
| 关键词 | Centralization
Corruption
Decentralization
Political agency
Quality of politicians
|
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7665
|
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
|
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物
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| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536502
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推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714 |
Facundo Albornoz-Crespo. DP7665 Fiscal Centralization and the Political Process. 2010.
|
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