| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7672 |
| DP7672 The Political Resource Curse | |
| Guido Tabellini; Roberto Perotti; Tommaso Nannicini; Fernanda Brollo | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-01-31 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of politicians, both with theory and data. The theory is based on a version of the career concerns model of political agency with endogenous entry of political candidates. The evidence refers to municipalities in Brazil, where federal transfers to municipal governments change exogenously according to given population thresholds. We exploit a regression discontinuity design to test the implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed features of political candidates at the municipal level. In accordance with the predictions of the theory, we find that larger transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Corruption Government spending Political selection |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7672 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536508 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Guido Tabellini,Roberto Perotti,Tommaso Nannicini,et al. DP7672 The Political Resource Curse. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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