| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7670 |
| DP7670 Asset Auctions, Information, and Liquidity | |
| Xavier Vives | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-02-07 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | A model is presented of a uniform price auction where bidders compete in demand schedules; the model allows for common and private values in the absence of exogenous noise. It is shown how private information yields more market power than the levels seen with full information. Results obtained here are broadly consistent with evidence from asset auctions, may help explain the response of central banks to the crisis, and suggest potential improvements in the auction formats of asset auctions. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Bid shading market power Reverse auctions |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7670 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536510 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Xavier Vives. DP7670 Asset Auctions, Information, and Liquidity. 2010. |
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