| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7674 |
| DP7674 The lender of last resort: liquidity provision versus the possibility of bail-out | |
| Sylvester Eijffinger; Rob Nijskens | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-02-07 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Banking regulation has proven to be inadequate to guard systemic stability in the recent financial crisis. Central banks have provided liquidity and ministries of finance have set up rescue programmes to restore confidence and stability. Using a model of a systemic bank suffering from liquidity shocks, we find that the unregulated bank keeps too much liquidity and takes excessive risk compared to the social optimum. A Lender of Last Resort can alleviate the liquidity problem, but induces moral hazard. Therefore, we introduce a fiscal authority that is able to bail out the bank by injecting capital. This authority faces a trade-off: when it imposes strict bailout conditions, investment increases but moral hazard ensues. Milder bailout conditions reduce excessive risk taking at the expense of investment. This resembles the current situation on financial markets, in which banks take less risk but also provide less credit to the economy. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Bailout Bank regulation Capital Lender of last resort Liquidity |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7674 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536511 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Sylvester Eijffinger,Rob Nijskens. DP7674 The lender of last resort: liquidity provision versus the possibility of bail-out. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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