| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7683 |
| DP7683 Price Discrimination under Customer Recognition and Mergers | |
| Helder Vasconcelos; Rosa Branca Esteves | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-02-07 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | This paper studies the interaction between horizontal mergers and price discrimination by endogenizing the merger formation process in the context of a repeated purchase model with two periods and three firms wherein firms may engage in Behaviour-Based Price Discrimination (BBPD). From a merger policy perspective, this paper's main contribution is two-fold. First, it shows that when firms are allowed to price discriminate, the (unique) equilibrium merger gives rise to significant increases in profits for the merging firms (the ones with information to price-discriminate), but has no effect on the outsider firm's profitability, thereby eliminating the so called `free-riding problem'. Second, this equilibrium merger is shown to increase industry profits at the expense of consumers' surplus, leaving total welfare unaffected. This then suggests that competition authorities should scrutinize with greater zeal mergers in industries where firms are expected to engage in BBPD. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Behaviour-based price discrimination Customer poaching Horizontal mergers |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7683 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536520 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Helder Vasconcelos,Rosa Branca Esteves. DP7683 Price Discrimination under Customer Recognition and Mergers. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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