| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7688 |
| DP7688 Family Values and the Regulation of Labor | |
| Alberto Alesina; Pierre Cahuc; Yann Algan; Paola Giuliano | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-02-14 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Flexible labor markets require geographically mobile workers to be efficient. Otherwise, firms can take advantage of the immobility of workers and extract monopsony rents. In cultures with strong family ties, moving away from home is costly. Thus, individuals with strong family ties rationally choose regulated labor markets to avoid moving and limiting the monopsony power of firms, even though regulation generates lower employment and income. Empirically, we do find that individuals who inherit stronger family ties are less mobile, have lower wages, are less often employed and support more stringent labor market regulations. There are also positive cross-country correlations between the strength of family ties and labor market rigidities. Finally, we find positive correlations between labor market rigidities at the beginning of the twenty first century and family values prevailing before World War II, which suggests that labor market regulations have deep cultural roots. |
| 主题 | Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Family values Labor markets regulation |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7688 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536525 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Alberto Alesina,Pierre Cahuc,Yann Algan,et al. DP7688 Family Values and the Regulation of Labor. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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