G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7705
DP7705 Conflicts of Interest, Reputation, and the Interwar Debt Crisis: Banksters or Bad Luck?
Marc Flandreau; Ugo Panizza; Norbert Gaillard
发表日期2010-02-21
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要This paper builds a new dataset with detailed information on the universe of foreign government bonds issued in New York in the 1920s and uses these data to describe the behavior of the financial intermediaries which operated in the New York market during the period leading to the interwar debt crisis. The paper starts by showing that concerns over reputation played an important role in intermediaries? underwriting choices. Next, the paper checks whether banks managed to charge abnormal underwriting fees on bonds that would eventually default and finds no evidence of such practice ("banksterism"). The paper concludes by discussing some parallels between the experience of the 1920s and the current debate on the "originate and distribute" model.
主题International Macroeconomics
关键词Conflicts of interest Debt crises Reputation
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7705
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536542
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Marc Flandreau,Ugo Panizza,Norbert Gaillard. DP7705 Conflicts of Interest, Reputation, and the Interwar Debt Crisis: Banksters or Bad Luck?. 2010.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Marc Flandreau]的文章
[Ugo Panizza]的文章
[Norbert Gaillard]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Marc Flandreau]的文章
[Ugo Panizza]的文章
[Norbert Gaillard]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Marc Flandreau]的文章
[Ugo Panizza]的文章
[Norbert Gaillard]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。