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来源类型 | Discussion paper |
规范类型 | 论文 |
来源ID | DP7705 |
DP7705 Conflicts of Interest, Reputation, and the Interwar Debt Crisis: Banksters or Bad Luck? | |
Marc Flandreau; Ugo Panizza; Norbert Gaillard | |
发表日期 | 2010-02-21 |
出版年 | 2010 |
语种 | 英语 |
摘要 | This paper builds a new dataset with detailed information on the universe of foreign government bonds issued in New York in the 1920s and uses these data to describe the behavior of the financial intermediaries which operated in the New York market during the period leading to the interwar debt crisis. The paper starts by showing that concerns over reputation played an important role in intermediaries? underwriting choices. Next, the paper checks whether banks managed to charge abnormal underwriting fees on bonds that would eventually default and finds no evidence of such practice ("banksterism"). The paper concludes by discussing some parallels between the experience of the 1920s and the current debate on the "originate and distribute" model. |
主题 | International Macroeconomics |
关键词 | Conflicts of interest Debt crises Reputation |
URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7705 |
来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536542 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Marc Flandreau,Ugo Panizza,Norbert Gaillard. DP7705 Conflicts of Interest, Reputation, and the Interwar Debt Crisis: Banksters or Bad Luck?. 2010. |
条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 |
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