| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7737 |
| DP7737 Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection | |
| Thomas Philippon; Vasiliki Skreta | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-03-14 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We study interventions to restore efficient lending and investment when financial markets fail because of adverse selection. We solve a design problem where the decision to participate in a program offered by the government can be a signal for private information. We charac terize optimal mechanisms and analyze specific programs often used during banking crises. We show that programs attracting all banks dominate those attracting only troubled banks, and that simple guarantees for new debt issuances implement the optimal mechanism, while equity injections and asset buyback do not. We also discuss the consequences of moral hazard. |
| 主题 | Financial Economics ; International Macroeconomics |
| 关键词 | Adverse selection Bailout Financial crisis Information Mechanism design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7737 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536573 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Philippon,Vasiliki Skreta. DP7737 Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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