G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7722
DP7722 Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers
Volker Nocke; Lucy White
发表日期2010-03-23
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要In a repeated game setting of a vertically related industry, we study the collusive effects of vertical mergers. We show that any vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion, no matter how large (in terms of capacity or size of product portfolio) the integrated downstream buyer. But a vertical merger with a larger buyer helps more to facilitate upstream collusion than a similar merger with a smaller buyer. This formalizes the idea expressed in the U.S. and EU non-horizontal merger guidelines that some downstream buyers may be more "disruptive" of collusive schemes than others.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Vertical merger Vertical integration Collusion Merger guidelines Antitrust
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7722
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536593
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Volker Nocke,Lucy White. DP7722 Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers. 2010.
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