| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7722 |
| DP7722 Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers | |
| Volker Nocke; Lucy White | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-03-23 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In a repeated game setting of a vertically related industry, we study the collusive effects of vertical mergers. We show that any vertical merger facilitates upstream collusion, no matter how large (in terms of capacity or size of product portfolio) the integrated downstream buyer. But a vertical merger with a larger buyer helps more to facilitate upstream collusion than a similar merger with a smaller buyer. This formalizes the idea expressed in the U.S. and EU non-horizontal merger guidelines that some downstream buyers may be more "disruptive" of collusive schemes than others. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Vertical merger Vertical integration Collusion Merger guidelines Antitrust |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7722 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536593 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Volker Nocke,Lucy White. DP7722 Vertical Merger, Collusion, and Disruptive Buyers. 2010. |
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