| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7758 |
| DP7758 Promising the right prize | |
| [unavailable] | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-03-28 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Prizes are often awarded to encourage research on products deemed of vital importance. We present a mechanism which can, in situations where the innovators are better informed about the difficulty of the research, tailor perfectly the expected reward to the expected research costs. The idea is to let the first successful inventor trade off the risk of having a competitor share the reward in exchange for a higher prize. If the goal of the designer is to minimize the prize awarded whilst encouraging innovators to conduct research, such a mechanism achieves the first best. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Innovation race Market commitment mechanism Prizes Sorting Mechanism design |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7758 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536595 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | [unavailable]. DP7758 Promising the right prize. 2010. |
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