G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7768
DP7768 Media Mergers and Media Bias with Rational Consumers
Simon Anderson; John McLaren
发表日期2010-03-28
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要We present an economic model of media bias and media mergers. Media owners have political motives as well as profit motives, and can influence public opinion by withholding information that is pejorative to their political agenda - provided that their agenda is not too far from the political mainstream. This is true even with rational consumers who understand the media owners? biases, because the public do not know how much information the news organizations have and so do not know when news is being withheld. In line with conventional wisdom, this problem can be undone by competition; but competition can be defeated in equilibrium by media mergers that enhance profits at the expense of the public interest. We thus derive a motive for media merger policy that is completely distinct from the motives behind conventional antitrust. While media bias may reduce the profit incentives to merge, media markets nonetheless err to being insufficiently competitive, and the consequences of merger are more severe than in other markets.
主题Industrial Organization
关键词Information withholding Market for news Media bias Media mergers
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7768
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536605
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Simon Anderson,John McLaren. DP7768 Media Mergers and Media Bias with Rational Consumers. 2010.
条目包含的文件
条目无相关文件。
个性服务
推荐该条目
保存到收藏夹
导出为Endnote文件
谷歌学术
谷歌学术中相似的文章
[Simon Anderson]的文章
[John McLaren]的文章
百度学术
百度学术中相似的文章
[Simon Anderson]的文章
[John McLaren]的文章
必应学术
必应学术中相似的文章
[Simon Anderson]的文章
[John McLaren]的文章
相关权益政策
暂无数据
收藏/分享

除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。