| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7785 |
| DP7785 Pricing and Information Disclosure in Markets with Loss-Averse Consumers | |
| Martin Peitz; Heiko Karle | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-04-19 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We develop a theory of imperfect competition with loss-averse consumers. All consumers are fully informed about match value and price at the time they make their purchasing decision. However, a share of consumers are initially uncertain about their tastes and form a reference point consisting of an expected match value and an expected price distribution, while other consumers are perfectly informed all the time. We derive pricing implications in duopoly with asymmetric firms. In particular, we show that a market may exhibit more price variation the larger the share of uninformed, loss-averse consumers. We also derive implications for firm strategy and public policy concerning firms? incentives to inform consumers about their match value prior to forming their reference point. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Advertising Behavioral industrial organization Imperfect competition Information disclosure Loss aversion Price variation Product differentiation Reference-dependent utility |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7785 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536621 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Martin Peitz,Heiko Karle. DP7785 Pricing and Information Disclosure in Markets with Loss-Averse Consumers. 2010. |
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