| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7822 |
| DP7822 Career Length: Effects of Curvature of Earnings Profiles, Earnings Shocks, and Social Security | |
| Thomas Sargent; Lars Ljungqvist | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-05-23 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | The high labor supply elasticity in an indivisible-labor model with employment lotteries emerges also without lotteries when individuals must instead choose career lengths. The more elastic are earnings to accumulated working time, the longer is a worker's career. Negative (positive) unanticipated earnings shocks reduce (increase) the career length of a worker holding positive assets at the time of the shock, while the effects are the opposite for a worker with negative assets. Government provided social security can attenuate responses of career length to earnings profile slope and earnings shocks by inducing a worker to retire at an official retirement age. |
| 主题 | International Macroeconomics ; Labour Economics |
| 关键词 | Career length Earnings profile Earnings shocks Indivisible labor Labor supply elasticity Social security Taxes |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7822 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536659 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Thomas Sargent,Lars Ljungqvist. DP7822 Career Length: Effects of Curvature of Earnings Profiles, Earnings Shocks, and Social Security. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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