| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7831 |
| DP7831 Tax Rules | |
| Hans Gersbach; Volker Hahn; Stephan Imhof | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-05-24 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine the provision of public projects under tax and subsidy rules. We find that tax rules separated from project cum subsidy decisions exhibit several advantages when incentive problems of the agenda-setter are taken into account. In particular, tax rules may prevent the proposal of inefficient projects that benefit only a small lobby group. We propose ?redistribution efficiency? as a socially desirable property of proposals and find that tax rules always guarantee this kind of efficiency. We show that rules on subsidies combined with discretion regarding taxes always yield socially inferior proposals. Finally, tax rules induce the agenda-setter to look for potential improvements of public projects. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Constitutional design Provision of public projects Taxes and subsidies Voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7831 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536669 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Volker Hahn,Stephan Imhof. DP7831 Tax Rules. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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