全球智库信息集成服务系统(G2TT): DP7848 The nature of information and its effect on bidding behavior: laboratory evidence in a common value auction

G2TT

来源类型	Discussion paper
规范类型	论文
来源ID	DP7848
	DP7848 The nature of information and its effect on bidding behavior: laboratory evidence in a common value auction
	Juan Carrillo; Isabelle Brocas; Manuel Castro
发表日期	2010-06-01
出版年	2010
语种	英语
摘要	We study in the laboratory a series of first price sealed bid auctions of a common value good. Bidders face three types of information: private information, public information and common uncertainty. Auctions are characterized by the relative size of these three information components. According to Nash Equilibrium theory, bids can be decomposed into two additive parts. For the private information, bidders should shade their bid. For the common uncertainty and public information, bidders should compete a la Bertrand and bid the expected and realized values respectively. We find that departures from equilibrium predictions occur not only with respect to private information but with respect to public information and common uncertainty as well. A cluster analysis reveals that subjects exhibit heterogeneous behavior with respect to all three information components. An estimation of the Cognitive Hierarchy and Cursed Equilibrium models reveals that both models capture important aspects of the subjects behavior. However, the disparity of the estimated parameters as we vary the relative size of the three types of information suggests that their predictive power is limited.
主题	Industrial Organization
关键词	Common value auction Laboratory experiment Winner's curse
URL	https://cepr.org/publications/dp7848
来源智库	Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型	智库出版物
条目标识符	http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536685
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Juan Carrillo,Isabelle Brocas,Manuel Castro. DP7848 The nature of information and its effect on bidding behavior: laboratory evidence in a common value auction. 2010.