| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7855 |
| DP7855 Family Ties and Organizational Design: Evidence from ChinesePrivate Firms | |
| Albert Park; Hongbin Li; Hongbin Cai; Li-An Zhou | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | Analyzing data from a unique survey of managers of Chinese private firms, we investigate how family ties with firm heads affect managerial compensation and job assignment. We find that family managers earn higher salaries and receive more bonuses, hold higher positions, and are given more decision rights and job responsibilities than non-family managers in the same firm. However, family managers face weaker incentives than professional managers as seen in the lower sensitivity of their bonuses to firm performance. Our findings are consistent with the predictions of a principal-agent model that incorporates family trust and endogenous job assignment decisions. We show that alternative explanations, such as taste-based favoritism, succession concerns, and unobserved ability or risk attitudes, are unlikely to drive our results. |
| 主题 | Development Economics ; Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Authority China Family firm Incentives |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7855 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536692 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Albert Park,Hongbin Li,Hongbin Cai,et al. DP7855 Family Ties and Organizational Design: Evidence from ChinesePrivate Firms. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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