G2TT
来源类型Discussion paper
规范类型论文
来源IDDP7857
DP7857 Does the Stock Market Harm Investment Incentives?
Alexander Ljungqvist; John Asker; Joan Farre-Mensa
发表日期2010-06-01
出版年2010
语种英语
摘要We examine whether stock market-listed firms in the U.S. invest suboptimally due to agency costs resulting from separation of ownership and control. We derive testable predictions to distinguish between underinvestment due to rational ?short-termism? and overinvestment due to ?empire building.? Empirical identification relies on a proxy for optimal investment derived from a rich new data source on unlisted U.S. firms. Listed firms invest less and are less responsive to changes in investment opportunities compared to matched unlisted firms, especially in industries in which stock prices are particularly sensitive to current profits. Listed firms also tend to smooth their earnings growth and dividends and are reluctant to report negative earnings. These findings are consistent with short-termism and contrary to what one would expect if empire-building were the dominant agency problem in the stock market. Our results suggest that the stock market harms investment incentives, at least for the fast-growing companies in our sample.
主题Financial Economics
关键词Agency problems Corporate investment Empire building Ipos Managerial incentives Managerial myopia Private companies Short-termism
URLhttps://cepr.org/publications/dp7857
来源智库Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom)
资源类型智库出版物
条目标识符http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536694
推荐引用方式
GB/T 7714
Alexander Ljungqvist,John Asker,Joan Farre-Mensa. DP7857 Does the Stock Market Harm Investment Incentives?. 2010.
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