| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7860 |
| DP7860 Debt-sensitive Majority Rules | |
| Hans Gersbach; Oliver Grimm; Johannes Gerd Becker | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | We examine debt-sensitive majority rules. According to such a rule, the higher a planned public debt, the higher the parliamentary majority required to approve it. In a two-period model we compare debt-sensitive majority rules with the simple majority rule when individuals differ regarding their benefits from public-good provision. We establish the existence of Condorcet winners under debt-sensitive majority rules and derive their properties. We find that equilibrium debt-levels are lower under the debt-sensitive majority rule if preferences regarding public goods are sufficiently heterogeneous and if the impact of debt on future public-good provision is sufficiently strong. We illustrate how debt-sensitive majority rules act as political stabilizers in the event of negative macroeconomic shocks. |
| 主题 | Public Economics |
| 关键词 | Debt restriction Debt-sensitive majority rule Fiscal policy Public debt Public goods Simple majority rule Voting |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7860 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536697 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Hans Gersbach,Oliver Grimm,Johannes Gerd Becker. DP7860 Debt-sensitive Majority Rules. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
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