| 来源类型 | Discussion paper |
| 规范类型 | 论文 |
| 来源ID | DP7871 |
| DP7871 Health insurance competition: the effect of group contracts | |
| jan boone; Rudy Douven; Ilaria Mosca | |
| 发表日期 | 2010-06-01 |
| 出版年 | 2010 |
| 语种 | 英语 |
| 摘要 | In countries like the US and the Netherlands health insurance is provided by private firms. These private firms can offer both individual and group contracts. The strategic and welfare implications of such group contracts are not well understood. Using a Dutch data set of about 700 group health insurance contracts over the period 2007-2008, we estimate a model to determine which factors explain the price of group contracts. We find that groups that are located close to an insurers' home turf pay a higher premium than other groups. This finding is not consistent with the bargaining argument in the literature as it implies that concentrated groups close to an insurer's home turf should get (if any) a larger discount than other groups. A simple Hotelling model, however, does explain our empirical results. |
| 主题 | Industrial Organization |
| 关键词 | Health insurance Health-plan choice Managed competition |
| URL | https://cepr.org/publications/dp7871 |
| 来源智库 | Centre for Economic Policy Research (United Kingdom) |
| 资源类型 | 智库出版物 |
| 条目标识符 | http://119.78.100.153/handle/2XGU8XDN/536708 |
| 推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | jan boone,Rudy Douven,Ilaria Mosca. DP7871 Health insurance competition: the effect of group contracts. 2010. |
| 条目包含的文件 | 条目无相关文件。 | |||||
除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。
